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Populism, democracy and a pedagogy of renewal 
  
Abstract   
 
Laclau and Mouffe have long argued the democratic possibilities of ‘left populism’ 
underpinned by their agonistic critique of liberal democracy. We are currently 
witnessing the attempted application of their theories by European political parties. 
However, there remains very little international scholarship taking up the challenge of 
situating these arguments in the broader literature on the relationship between 
democracy and education. We argue that this is an urgent task, particularly in the 
context of populist trends which appear inimical to educational practice. Thus, we 
explore the implications of populism for adult education aimed at defending and 
extending democratic life. We question the conflation of agonistic democracy with 
left populism on several grounds, and we consider how a focus on education might 
help to ground their theory and clarify its ambiguities. We argue that adult educators 
can surface aspects of the context which representations of populism on the one hand, 
and populist representations on the other, often hide. Our argument is illustrated 
through two vignettes of populist events and the educational problems and 
opportunities they posed. 
  
 
Introduction 
 
Is populism the cause of a democratic deficit in different nation states across the 
globe or is it a consequence of them? Are populist movements necessarily inimical to 
democracy? The rise of populism generally is associated with the dog whistle politics 
of racist, bigoted, xenophobic and homophobic language, the 'othering' of social and 
ethnic groups, and the cult of  ‘strong leaders’ who claim to speak for the people. 
Furthermore, the political turn towards an inward looking, insular and chauvinistic 
nationalism in the US, UK, Turkey, India and many West and Eastern European 
states reinforces such concerns that populism is intrinsically bad for democracy. 
However, in what circumstances might populism provide opportunities for enriching 
democratic life? In this article we argue that despite the inauspicious circumstances, 
the contradictions of the current context also create possibilities to further adult 
education for democracy.  
 
Firstly, we develop our argument drawing on the theoretical work of Gramsci (1971) 
on hegemony, and Mouffe (2000) and Laclau (2005) on populism and agonism. 
Following Gramsci, we argue that the wave of populist politics reflects a breakdown 
of the hegemony of liberal democracy. However, the case is made that populism is a 
vague term which has been used to (mis)represent a wide range of different 
mobilisations of discontent covering very different ideological positions and 
educational possibilities. It is precisely in the fact that people are mobilised to engage 
in the political arena that populism can generate a public space for critical education 
where ‘problem definitions’ and ‘solutions’ are critically assessed. Whilst 
representations of populism in the west are often antithetical to critical thinking, in 
the Latin American context (and historically in the US) populism was associated with 
a progressive politics where education and action were aligned (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2017).  Nevertheless, critical education does not always have the choice 
of engaging with a progressive politics and must also operate in relatively hostile 
public spaces.  
 
Secondly, we illustrate this argument through two vignettes, one local and the other 
national in scale: in the former, one author reflects on their professional work 
responding to a media generated campaign of hostility against the relocation of a sex 
offender into a community. This example captures a number of elements of populism 
(although not explicitly political populism) stirred by a hostile media campaign and 
generating a difficult public space for educational intervention. The second vignette is 
on a national scale and derives from another author’s engagement with the Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014. The campaign for independence had many of the 
characteristics of a populist movement which also created opportunities for critical 
education in public spaces. 
 
According to Streeck (2017a), populism signals 'the return of the repressed' as the 
victims of austerity, who had been ignored in mainstream policies, found a way to 
vent their anger at the ballot box by rejecting parties which they no longer trusted and 
offered them little real choice. We can categorise Brexit and the election of Trump in 
these terms without, at the same time, downplaying the nativism and ‘othering’ of 
marginalised and minority groups that were evident in both these events. Nonetheless, 
we suggest that anger can be a powerful motive for learning, and how educators 
respond to this anger is significant. 
  
In reversing the way populism has been rejected tout court we need to explore the 
context in which populist trends have emerged and the function of populism in 
politics. This analytical and conceptual clarification is the essential precursor for 
addressing what educators can do, in these circumstances, to enhance democracy. By 
this we mean the capacity of people to engage in political institutions and procedures 
as well as to participate actively and critically in political thinking, analysis and 
debate. Democracy as a political system has to be built on the foundations of 
democracy as a way of life, as an ingrained cultural practice, because without such a 
solid base the institutions, procedures and practices of democracy can be readily 
undermined. It is in developing a democratic culture based on critical thought and 
emotion that adult and informal education in communities has a key contribution to 
make in resourcing democracy. 
 
 
The interregnum: the struggle for hegemony 
 
Gramsci's notion of the interregnum is a useful way of thinking about the current 
political context and its contradictions. In Gramsci's analysis, an interregnum is an 
indicator of the decline of hegemony of the ruling forces and a stalemate in the 
creation of an alternative. 'The old is dying', according to Gramsci (1971, p. 276) 'but 
the new cannot yet be born and in such circumstances many morbid symptoms are 
evident'. It is, as Gramsci understood, ‘a time of monsters’ where Caesarist political 
options emerge in terms of the ‘strong man’ who can channel the collective will of 
the people and resolve problems. Caesarism, for Gramsci, was a concept that 
encompassed the rise of fascism but could also apply to more progressive political 
outcomes (Gramsci, 1971, p.219). The reactionary political forces in the US and 
across various states in Europe, and other parts of the world, are indicative of this 
dangerous political development.  
  
Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony involves the active consent of the masses to their 
own subordination through processes of formal and informal learning in civil society. 
When this is no longer given, the ruling group has to rely on coercion which, though 
indicating the fragility of their rule, can further undermine their authority. Coercion 
might involve naked force, however, it can take subtler forms, such as welfare 
coercion to ensure people comply, or hostile ideological framing and demonisation of 
particular groups. At the same time, a fragile hegemony is an opening for new ideas, 
values and priorities to come into the light. It is in these cracks that the space for 
critical education occurs. Populism, in this sense, can represent an affective disavowal 
of the existing order of politics, yet this doesn’t imply that it provides a coherent 
cognitive map for critique.    
 
Streeck (2017b) argues that the disintegration of the dominant hegemony is not 
because a new, more appealing ideology is hegemonic, but that capitalism is 
decomposing from its internal contradictions as inequality reaches grotesque 
proportions, public and private debt mountains grow and rampant globalization 
increases insecurity. Whereas the state stepped in to bail out the banks in the 
subprime crisis of 2008, it has primarily been the emergence of right-wing populism 
that has reasserted the authority of the nation state to provide security in an unstable 
world. The frailty of democratic institutions to defend social protections has been 
exposed – instead, the dominance of neoliberalism since the late 1970s has ensured 
these institutions are part of the problem. This is why we need to go beyond liberal 
democracy whilst also preserving what is valuable in it (namely, social, civil and 
political rights). 
 
Streeck’s (2017a, 2017b) analysis of the future is deeply pessimistic with no 
foreseeable end to this interregnum. However, we ought to ask ourselves the question 
Stuart Hall (1996, p. 233) posed: ‘are we thinking dialectically enough?’ This 
question challenges us to look beyond the surface of social forces, however 
reactionary they seem to be, to understand their potential contradictions. As Mayo 
(2015) notes, Gramsci himself never used the term ‘counter-hegemony’ as if the 
problem of social change could be posed in simplistic binary terms of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ trends. Building the kind of intellectual, moral and cultural basis for a 
progressive politics, that is to say, a participatory political process of informed and 
critical engagement, has to work on and through people’s experiences of the 
contradictions and conflicts of everyday life in a dialogical process of understanding 
people’s affective and cognitive motivations. In our view, hope lies in terms of 
rekindling democratic life and transforming it. Simply defending liberal democracy as 
we know it ignores the need to become the midwife ‘to the new that has not yet been 
born’.  
 
Civic literacy and ‘epistemological populism’: are we thinking dialectically 
enough? 
 
Considered from an educational perspective, populism can certainly be read as a 
manifestation of the neoliberal attack on ‘civic literacy’ (Giroux, 2016). In this 
analysis, the privatisation of public space and subordination of everyday life to the 
accelerated rhythms of digitally networked capitalism, all combine to diminish the 
democratic intellect. Lifelong education has, in turn, been reduced to mere lifelong 
learning—a project of the ‘resilient’ self under conditions of labour market precarity, 
in lieu of state-based welfare (Crowther, 2004). 
 
Arguably, this hollowing out of lifelong education has, over time, generated the 
conditions for ‘epistemological populism’, marked by the open hostility towards 
intellectuals in democratic life, a studied impatience for complexity in the face of 
‘crisis’, and a concomitant valorisation of ‘common sense’ solutions (Moffit and 
Tormey, 2014). Such ‘epistemological populism’ is recursively cultivated by populist 
political leaders, who have little interest in enriching the fabric of democratic life in 
communities, and more interest in arrogating the will of ‘the people’ to their own 
agendas (Müller, 2016; Moffit and Tormey, 2014). della Porta (2017) classifies this 
as a plebiscitary relationship between leaders and followers, rather than a 
participatory one. 
 
Whilst such analysis helps us to understand the present, our interest lies in asking 
what educators might achieve by starting from the presupposition that populism 
might be employed ‘dialectically’ to resource learning for democracy. In order to 
achieve this, it follows that educators wishing to intervene in such contexts ought to 
be equipped with a critical understanding of populism—its functions and features —
in order to practice skilfully, reflexively and creatively.  
 
Regarding the function of populism in public discourse, educators concerned with 
civic literacy ought to pay close attention to the ways in which heterogenous political 
developments are gathered together and evaluated under the signifiers ‘populism’ and 
‘populist’. The first point to note is that populism is often used pejoratively—it 
remains unusual for individuals to self-identify as populists (Moffit and Tormey, 
2014, p. 383). Thus, it has been argued that populism is used by privileged groups in 
the media as a rhetorical device to justify the status quo by creating a cynical false 
equivalence between the idea of a democratic people and the idea of dangerous, 
uneducated throng (Fraser, 2017). This proposition alone might act as a useful 
provocation for educational work, in the sense that it offers a starting point for the 
collective deconstruction of media representations of populism itself by diverse 
communities, who are interpellated under the undiscriminating banner of populism. 
 
Considering the above in the context of our aims, it is therefore logical to turn 
towards the work of those who might conceptualise populism in a non-pejorative 
fashion, as a resource for critical adult education as well as the left. This is advocated 
by the late Laclau (2006), and currently by Mouffe, who argues urgently “pour un 
populisme de gauche” (2016), as an alternative to the ‘false choice’ between the 
populist right and neoliberalism. Laclau and Mouffe’s (L&M hereafter) political 
theory has, in an unlikely turn of events, directly shaped the strategy of European 
political parties such as Podemos, Syriza and La France Insoumise (Desmoulières, 
2017; Fassin et al., 2018; Hancox, 2015; Iglesias, 2015). Below, we outline L&M’s 
critique of liberal democracy and their alternative theory of agonistic democracy. We 
then go onto articulate the left populist position, before arguing against the temptation 
to conflate agonistic democracy with populism. We conclude the section by reasoning 
that a politics of affect is central to populist politics and agonistic democracy, even 
whilst we maintain that there are good reasons to keep the concepts distinct from one 
another. The implication for educators working with communities is that the 
development of agonistic democratic spaces is an affective, and not merely cognitive, 
task. 
 
Populism and agonistic democracy: a problematic equivalence? 
 
L&M‘s (1985) ‘agonistic’ alternative to liberal democracy is based on the ontological 
proposition that social identities and practices (at any scale) are radically contingent, 
only secured through the precarious exclusion of other possibilities (Mouffe, 2013). 
This pluralist position rejects the liberal idealist tradition of political philosophy, in 
which it is imagined that the plurality of values and perspectives in the world-at-large 
could objectively constitute a ‘harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble’ (Mouffe, 
2013, p. 3). In trying to build a consensus out of plurality, exclusions from liberal 
democratic orders are framed by their proponents as the irrational ‘other’—a threat to 
the pragmatic rational consensus, reproduced by politicians and technocrats. Against 
this liberal idealism, the word agonism denotes the generative power of antagonism, 
of dissent, of conflict. In particular, Mouffe (2013) speaks of a ‘conflictual 
consensus’ as a different kind of regulative ideal for democratic life.  
 
L&M view the construction of a ‘people’, in opposition to a common adversary, as 
the central task of democratic politics, where this construction is neither intrinsically 
left or right in ideological orientation (Laclau, 2006). Whilst it is commonplace to 
suggest that populist political movements oppose ‘the people’ to an accountable cadre 
of corrupt ‘elites’, L&M argue that, whilst the ‘people’ of populism is an intrinsically 
oppositional construction, the source of antagonism can be constructed in multiple 
ways exceeding ‘the elite’, depending on what is politically expedient: for example, 
‘the liberal elites’, ‘Europe’, ‘globalisation’, ‘immigrant workers’, ‘ethnic minorities’, 
‘neoliberalism’, ‘Westminster’, and so on (Laclau, 2006, p. 65). How this is filled out 
with ideological content is contingent, however, what it can do is generate alternative 
political narratives which motivate people to engage in politics. The current wave of 
populism demonstrates the degree of discontent that ‘politics as normal’ generated 
through its failure, globally, to rein in neoliberal globalisation, inequality and poverty. 
 
The significance of ideological content is particularly important in creating spaces for 
educational engagement. The ideological narratives of populisms as well as the 
structuring of relationships between people and political leaders are critical points. 
For instance, della Porta (2017) and Fassin et al. (2018) both home in on the obvious 
ideological differences between contemporary left and right populism: firstly, whilst 
left populists oppose neoliberalism and favour the forging of cosmopolitan alliances 
for social justice and inclusive welfare, right populist claims (whilst critical of 
vaguely expressed ‘elite’ power), tend towards xenophobic and racist welfare 
chauvinism. Clearly there are significant differences at the level of “sociopolitical 
content of their claims” (della Porta, 2017, p. 34), but we also need to avoid the 
fallacy of equating the claims and interests of a populist leader with its ‘populist’ 
people. What motivates the former and what motivates the latter may overlap but can 
be radically different in many respects (see our two examples discussed later). 
Therefore, it is important to also understand populism in organisational and relational 
terms.  
 
An important threat populism poses to liberal democracy, is related to the nature of 
representation. The legitimacy of liberal democracy has depended on a balance 
between avoiding ‘too much’ participation (a threat to the autonomy of the elected 
representative) and ‘too little’ participation, which undermines political claims to 
represent the authority of the electorate. How these interact in populist moments can 
be significant. Increased political participation, as discussed in vignette two (on the 
Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014) can deepen democratic possibilities and 
create significant spaces for educational work as well as challenges for educators. 
‘Too little’ participation, in the sense of passive engagement with political leaders, 
can lead to authoritarian outcomes. della Porta (2017, pp. 34-38) distinguishes 
‘progressive social movements’ from reactionary populism by focusing on the 
participatory organisational structures of the former, and the plebiscitary 
organisational relations of the latter. Plebiscites without participation in political 
thinking amounts to tokenistic involvement (see Arnstein, 1969). In addition, we need 
to factor in Gramsci’s argument about Caesarism, in that the ‘will’ of the ‘the people’ 
becomes embodied in the ‘strong man’ who eventually has little need of plebiscites or 
any other form of political participation to legitimate his actions. This is the road to 
fascism where educational possibilities are crushed.  
 
The relationship between participation and populism is important to educators 
because whilst sophisticated dialogue in and across communities can be a democratic 
learning process, the plebiscitary invocation of the people is structurally different in 
its opportunism and indifference towards democracy as a collective learning process, 
involving both cognitive and affective capacities. Populist movements fueled by 
misogynistic, racist and xenophobic political rhetoric have to be confronted for what 
they are, without necessarily attributing these values and beliefs to be intrinsic to 
people who find them persuasive at some level. Alternative narratives are also 
possible and may gain traction in different circumstances (see vignette 1). More 
importantly, the emergence of populist politics has stirred an engagement with 
politics amongst groups of people who have long been alienated from traditional 
political elites. As Fassin et al. (2018, p.84) highlight, young people, racialised 
minorities and disaffected working class groups, might provide a potential vein of 
support for a more critical politics, but such groups need to be listened to rather than 
dismissed as the problem. Of course, there are hardcore racist, sexist, homophobic 
views that are deeply ingrained in some people who are unlikely to change their 
perspective through educational intervention. But in general, people who have been 
systematically ignored by political elites are not the inevitable constituency of the far 
right, and creating educational engagement that enables people to reframe their 
positions is important.  
 
L&M’s theory of agonistic democracy urges us to be attentive to the fact that the 
ontological need to express dissent—and the affective repertoires that manifest this 
need—often exceed the range of existing possibilities in liberal democracy. This 
creates a problem and opportunity for democracy and educational intervention. 
Populism has been used to reflect the motivation, by a wider cross-section of 
disaffected communities to engage in politics which, in many cases, has been 
articulated in politically regressive ways but this political direction is not inevitable. 
Critical education cannot stop fascism but it can work with the participatory social 
forces and disaffected people who have been alienated from ‘post-politics’ (in 
Mouffe’s terms).  
 
Towards a more agonistic public sphere 
 
The challenge for educators to develop civic literacy is to find spaces and 
opportunities to build a culture of agonistic dialogue, of ‘conflictual consensus’, such 
that the passionate claims, interests and analyses of local communities find expression 
through participatory relations that are critically and reflexively informed, rather than 
being interpellated as ‘populist’ expressions, through ‘plebiscitary relations’ or the 
Caesarist politics of reaction.  
 
Critical education has to start from the premise that any representation of ‘the people’ 
is a hegemonic operation, in the sense that particular interests and identities attempt 
to speak for everyone. As a result, dissenting and minority voices, such as 
intersectional feminist justice claims, can often be suppressed and excluded, even in 
supposedly ‘left’ spaces  (Bassel and Emejulu, 2017). In the authors’ political 
contexts, prior to the EU referendum in the UK, when everyday discussions of 
‘Brexit’ turned to the forgotten working classes as a proxy for ‘the people’, we might 
rhetorically ask to what extent did this tacitly refer to the embodiment of general 
‘working class-ness’ in specific cultures of white heteronormative masculinity? This 
point has been made recently by sociologist Les Back (2018, p. 197): in a context of 
“white populist movements who claim to be the rightful heirs of society’s resources”, 
he argues that “there is an urgent need for community development workers not 
simply to concede to populist claims but open up a critical space within communities 
affected by economic decline.” Eddo-Lodge’s (2017) discussion of race and class 
offers a clear account of how dominant cultural imagery attaches working class 
identity to whiteness, in spite of a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating the 
intersectional complexity of working class identity in Britain. These are some of the 
kinds of resources that educators might bring to bear when working with communities 
to reflexively examine exclusionary constructions of ‘the people’.  
 
Ultimately, Laclau (2005, p. 88) argues that since social division is intrinsic to the 
construction of any ‘people’, the affective need to express it can often be stronger 
than its attachment to any particular political commitment. This reasoning partially 
explains why ephemeral outbursts of community politics can be channeled in 
different directions in moments of vacillation, including right-wing populist 
nationalism. To bring these arguments down from the lofty realm of social ontology 
to the messy educational realities of communities, an engagement with the feminist 
politics of affect serves as an important bridge. Feminist writers have highlighted the 
significance of emotion as both structuring and being structured by power ridden 
social and cultural relations (Ahmed, 2004; Davidson et al., 2005). Emotions such as 
rage, anger, fear and shame are profoundly relational, generated by and expressive of 
the historical, social and cultural context in which human beings are embedded. A 
neoliberal culture founded on unequal power relations and individualist explanations 
of social problems, thrives on emotions of fear, mistrust, rage, hate and apathy. This  
undermines solidarity and collectivism, encouraging the type of retreat into personal 
isolation which undermines any form of coherent protest (Forster et al., 2018). 
Arguably, negative emotions then can be channeled to authoritarian ends, potentially 
making people unwittingly complicit in their own oppression. 
 
A curriculum to engage with either representations of populism or populist 
representations will have to make space for exploring emotions as locations of, and 
resources for, political learning and struggle (Amsler, 2011, p. 58). The important 
point from this is that people have inevitable blind spots, depending on their own 
standpoints, in relation to whether they see an affective response (desire, hope, 
happiness, anger, frustration, disgust, embarrassment and so on) as legitimate or 
illegitimate, as the product of personal trouble or public issue, especially where 
attributions of privilege and responsibility are brought to the fore (Ahmed, 2004).  
 
Below, we seek to demonstrate how this conceptual framework relates to a scaled 
down version of populism stoked by irrational fears of a sex predator being relocated 
to a community. Vignette one addresses how genuine fear in a local community, 
misdirected by the simplification of social problems fueled by the media, was turned 
towards a more critical and participatory process of educational engagement on the 
issue of violence against women. After this, we turn to our second vignette, which is 
scaled up to the national Scottish context where the demand for independence from 
the UK was framed in the media as a populist nationalism. In this example, we 
outline how official and unofficial campaigns for independence from the UK 
generated distinct, whilst overlapping, opportunities for participation in political 
thinking and spaces for educational work in communities. These examples relate to 
the kinds of populism we have previously discussed although, in the first vignette, the 
right-wing populist rhetoric related to the sex offender is on a different scale and less 
directly connected with formal politics. It demonstrates, nonetheless, how 
engagement in a local issue, driven by an epistemologically populist analysis of 
sexual violence against women, provided an affective opening for people to mobilise, 
and subsequently, an opportunity for the educator to develop critical engagement with 
this issue in a hostile public space. These local scales of intervention are important 
because the provision of alternative vocabularies for reframing social problems can 
help people to map their emotions onto a critical analyses rather than directing their 
emotional energy against a ‘folk devil’.  
 
Vignette one: Public activism and a sex offender: Addressing the real concerns 
 
One of the main links between right-wing populism and politics is a redrawing of 
boundaries that are exclusive rather than inclusive, demonising particular groups in 
the process. Therefore, it is unsurprising that educators tend to recoil from the 
regressive aspect of ‘populist’ activities and may line up with the chorus of despair 
that it has generated. This kind of anger can generate what Freire (1972) would term 
‘horizontal violence’, wherein one vulnerable social group attacks another, despite 
both groups being victims of structural inequalities. The challenge is to turn this 
towards purposeful hope. We use a vignette here to illuminate our argument that both 
reactionary and progressive community activism can create an opportunity for 
democratic debate through adult education.  
 
This example based on ‘insider’ research from one author’s practice experience uses 
data from interviews carried out in 2012 with two key community activists, two local 
authority managers, two voluntary sector managers, a review of press coverage and 
the author’s participant observations. Many theorists have contested the myth of 
researcher as objective, neutral observer (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005). The 
account presented here then does not aspire to value-free objectivity but rather offers 
an illustration of how applying critical theoretical perspectives to engagement 
practice with community activists might create space for dialogue, critical thinking 
and learning (King and Learmonth, 2014).   
 
 As we have highlighted, populist protest can reflect an affective need to express 
dissent. Unmet democratic demands at the local level can join together in a chain of 
equivalence through directing feelings of hostility towards a common adversary. This 
was illustrated in 2012, when a small Scottish ex-mining community rapidly 
organised mass demonstrations of around 1700 people, protesting against the 
relocation of a high profile sex offender to their (and his) home area. The 
predominantly working-class protests were organised by three disparate local women 
using a Facebook page that, at its height, attracted twelve thousand subscribers. A 
panic ensued amongst local government service providers about how to deal with the 
situation. At the time, the author (in her capacity as a local government Equalities 
Engagement Officer) was requested to work with Lily, one of the key organisers of 
the protests, and her fellow community activists. 
 
As has often been the case, the tabloid media played a key role in stirring up the 
protest (Thompson, 2000). The offender’s media profile was maintained at the time of 
his violent rape of a foreign student, when he was dubbed a ‘monster’ during his 
prison sentence, and after his release, by following him from prison and making his 
new home address public. News media has a long history of portraying violence 
against women as an issue primarily attributable to mad, bad or sad deviants 
(Cowburn 2010; Pain & Scottish Women’s Aid 2012). The implicit message 
conveyed is that violence against women is primarily an issue of concern for the 
individual women who have the misfortune to encounter (or are stupid enough to put 
themselves in the path of) the occasional random stranger who is so monstrous as to 
do them harm. The focus of action for women to protect themselves, then, is in 
changing their own behavior to keep themselves safe or locking up individual men 
who have demonstrated their capacity for violence. 
 
Of course, the reality of violence against women is that women have most to fear 
from men that they know as Femicide census statistics (www.womensaid.org.uk) and 
the recent #MeToo campaign have illustrated (Burke & Milano 2017). The reality of 
socially embedded gender inequality and associated abuse of male power over 
women is concealed by a media which itself engages in practices serving to promote 
and indeed normalise gender inequality such as the ongoing sexual objectification of 
women and the refusal to positively represent, or indeed make visible, the full range 
of female identities and achievements. The media’s culpability, in contributing to the 
tolerance of male abuse of power over women that sets the stage for violence, is 
obscured by constructing the problem as one of individual deviance in the form of a 
‘folk devil.’  
 
It was important then for the worker in this situation to critically consider the local 
expressions of dissent in relation to this more complex reality. It was important to 
carefully consider the question of who was protesting in this particular location and 
why. The particular reasons why people came together were varied and only found 
common expression against their ‘adversary’. In reality, they had different roots and 
implications. There was a high incidence of domestic violence in the area where the 
demonstrations took place and both victims and perpetrators were visible on 
demonstrations as the following quotes from individuals interviewed at the time make 
clear: 
  
[W]e knew that there were registered sex offenders taking part in the 
demonstrations apparently deflecting attention from their own behavior.  
 
(Local Authority Senior Manager) 
 
The return of this man to the community touched a nerve for women who had 
experienced abuse and many became involved in the campaign. I know this 
because they have been in touch with our service and disclosed at events.  
 
(Women’s Aid Manager) 
  
It is also important to note that the offender, on whom the protests were focused, was 
well known in the local area and came from a family with some notoriety for the 
violence and intimidation of other local people. So while some people on the 
demonstrations may have had old scores to settle with this specific individual, for 
women who had experienced domestic violence, the demonstrations could be 
understood as fulfilling a need to (safely) express anger and opposition to male 
violence against women. A focus on this individual offender also apparently gave 
perpetrators of domestic violence an opportunity to construct their own behavior as 
essentially different, or less monstrous than the crime perpetrated by him. 
  
The extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP) attempted to capitalise on the 
demonstrations handing out “Pro-Fam - Protect the Family” placards, initially 
accepted by protesters before they realised these were BNP sponsored. Nick Griffin 
(the former BNP leader) and some of his supporters also turned up to 'lend support' to 
the campaign to get the sex offender out of the community, but the BNP presence was 
generally rebuffed. 
  
We were donated these placards and accepted them in good faith. These guys 
just turned up at the protest and began handing them out. They just read ‘Pro 
Fam: Protect the Family’, nobody had a clue as to their political connotations.  
 
(Protest leader online deadline news agency 2012) 
  
Attempts by the above political groups to make their demands part of the common 
cause were rejected. As highlighted earlier, the constituents of civic protest are by no 
means homogeneous and there were clearly a range of reasons people participated, 
even though the stated focus of this demonstration was keeping local women safe. As 
local providers indicated, there was considerable justification for concern that women 
were not being adequately protected from male violence in this community. The 
housing of this highly visible violent man had given some women an opportunity for 
agency, to make their anger and fear clear. This is significant when we consider that 
domestic violence, in the nature of the coercive control or abuse of power employed, 
is often very effectively hidden (Stark, 2007). 
  
What is important here is how the problem is understood. A key issue for the local 
government staff was essentially how to manage the people involved in these 
protests, to minimise the disruption created by the protests outside the offender’s new 
home. Alongside police and social work services they had a legal responsibility to 
manage his release from prison. For the Equalities Officer, the primary issue of 
concern was neither the perceived danger represented by this offender, or managing 
the community protests, but rather addressing the underlying issue of male violence 
against women in the context of socially embedded gender inequality.  
  
In the first instance, this involved discussing the issue with one of the key protest 
organisers and then a group of both male and female protesters with whom she was 
aligned. It was important to listen to their concerns but also to challenge the 
perception that the rehoused offender was the biggest threat to local women’s safety. 
The author did not come to this dialogue value free but from a critical educational 
perspective, which acknowledged gender and class inequality as shaping local social 
relations. The process of being involved in activism offered not only an opportunity 
to experience solidarity with others but a chance to critically reflect on an issue of 
concern and consider causes and solutions. It was, from the Equalities Officer’s point 
of view, an opportunity to listen to, value and respect activists’ concerns but also to 
engage in critical dialogue about the issue of violence against women, to consider 
who has power and why. 
 
The role of the author in this case was to negotiate educational input from Rape Crisis 
and Women’s Aid for this group of activists. These sessions enabled the protesters to 
gain access to a feminist perspective on violence against women and to critically 
reflect on the issue. Some of the activists (mainly men) disengaged at this point, but 
for some, their involvement in the local campaign, and the alarming number of 
disclosures of domestic violence and sexual abuse they were confronting on their 
Facebook page, motivated them to learn more through critical engagement with the 
issue. A positive outcome of these sessions was some activists’ decision to shift their 
focus from the campaign against the single offender to posting links to Women’s Aid 
and Rape Crisis where a wide constituency of women could get more information and 
help. They wanted to raise awareness and educate others about the issues and how 
they might be supported if affected by them. 
  
We see ourselves as about educating people and changing attitudes. A lot of 
abusers are not visible – we want to give information so that people recognise 
abuse and don’t feel they have to put up with it. 
 
 (Community Activist) 
  
In the end a relatively small number of community activists participated, but 
supporting these women to find successful strategies to address their concerns was 
crucial in terms of building a sense of personal and political efficacy potentially 
motivating future civic activism (Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014). Having the space 
to critically consider the ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ of the issue about which they were 
most concerned created the opportunity to reflect on how they could most usefully 
focus their effort to promote change. Such spontaneous and reactive community 
activism can disappear as quickly as it started, as was the case in this instance. 
However, knowledge gained during the process cannot be so quickly unlearned. 
Local people's community activism, in this case initially framed in narrow populist 
terms, opened up a space to engage in critical education, learning and debate on 
dominant ideas and normative cultural practices in relation to gender and the 
prevention of violence against women. 
 
Vignette two: Ways of doing politics: The Scottish Referendum experience in 
2014 
 
In our next example we discuss populism in the context of nationalism, a political 
narrative often associated with a regressive, nativist politics, aiming to duck the 
realities of a globalised world by appealing to national and ethnic chauvinism to tame 
events out of control; receding backwards to national frontiers, singling out those who 
really belong and 'the other' who does not belong. Trump in the US and various right-
wing political leaders across Europe have capitalised on the political promise of this 
version of security in an unsecure world. But the ideological elasticity of nationalism 
(Hall, 1993) needs to be factored into the analysis, and how 'the people' of the nation 
are constructed and what they are against can be more complex than the depiction 
above presents. Moreover, radical social and political ferment is often the motivation 
for serious educational activity of a formal and informal type. In this light we want to 
address the Scottish referendum for independence in 2014. 
  
The evidence for this vignette is drawn from a number of sources: the engagement of 
one author as a participant in a number of hustings and public events about the 
implications of the referendum, as a facilitator in five participatory seminars held in 
Edinburgh to engage the public in the analysis of referendum issues, in the 
organisation of three national workshops (Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee) for 
community educators working in communities, after the referendum, to examine their 
role in political education and how it might be developed, and through a small 
number of selective interviews with community practitioners in Edinburgh, Aberdeen 
and Glasgow, on the work they were (and were not) engaged in and, finally, from an 
online survey of experiences of the referendum (for further details see Crowther, 
2018, 2015; Crowther,  Boeren, and Mackie 2018; Crowther et al., 2017). 
 
The Scottish referendum involved a yes/no decision on independence from the UK, 
which was reflected in two campaign groups supported by different political parties. 
On the one hand there were the mainstream political parties (the Conservatives, the 
Scottish Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats), who supported the politics of the 
union with the UK. On the other, two political parties (the Scottish National Party and 
the Green Party), which supported independence from the UK. 
  
What was noted by a number of political commentators in Scotland was the 
remarkable surge of unexpected and unofficial campaign groups, along with the 
spontaneous popular interest in the issues that involved self-education of hundreds 
and thousands of Scottish people (see Hassan, 2014; Mitchell, 2014). Community 
groups, organisations and movements across the length and breadth of the country 
were intent on self-educational activities aimed at promoting or rejecting the cause of 
independence and what it might mean. Unofficial campaigns also ignited in the 
digital sphere with over 700 blog sites and social media groups providing a vibrant, 
humorous, critical, opinionated and flourishing online opportunity for people to 
engage in politics in their own way, circumventing the restrictions of the mass media, 
formal political structures, parties and processes. People engaged, individually or 
collectively, through the activities of campaign groups, social media sites, friendship 
networks, online and offline, and locally-organised community provision, in 
discussion and debate about the issues that mattered to them. It was at the community 
level that a wide range of grassroots initiatives canvassed for voter registration, raised 
awareness, stimulated debate and, in the main, promoted independence. There were 
pro-union groups but these were much less visible and less active at a community 
level. 
  
All this official and unofficial ‘political education’ had an impact on political 
thinking. Around 95% of the electorate registered to vote and over 85% voted on the 
day, which was in remarkable contrast to the typical electoral turnout in UK and 
Scottish Parliamentary elections. People also learned to change their views. In 2013 
support for independence was around 25% but this increased significantly to almost 
45% at the time of the vote in September 2014. 
  
According to Laclau (2005), how the ‘people’ are constructed is critical to the nature 
of the conflicts generated and the ideological possibilities for change. When cracks 
appear in the dominant consensus of politics these are opportunities to create linkages 
between different groups, through a populist identity, that can lead to alliances and 
the mobilisation of change efforts. What is interesting about the Scottish experience is 
that the referendum on independence reflected the mobilisation of conventional 
political subjects (i.e. voters in the classical sense of liberal democracy who were to 
choose a political preference) along with new political subjects who were self-
organised and began to fill independence with new political demands. This is outlined 
below in terms of two distinct political frontiers being established (which overlapped 
in reality). 
  
Nationalism as a political frontier 
 
In the official campaign there were two distinct forms of nationalism which aimed to 
mobilise support for and against independence. Firstly, the case for independence was 
presented as a form of civic nationalism which was open to migrants and people who 
wanted to live and commit to Scotland. Independence was essential to achieve the 
level of political agency in Scotland that was being held back by the UK Parliament. 
On the fringes of this was also a form of identity nationalism, of being Scots first and 
foremost and, on the extreme edge of identity politics, was a darker anti-English 
nationalism. Secondly, there was British nationalism although it was never framed as 
such. From this perspective, Scottish separatism would undermine the role of the UK 
in the wider world, which it had benefited from. The British nationalist case was 
partly based on identity (with some extreme Union Jack, flag waving, supporters) but 
also on the economic benefits of union to Scots – the benefits which derived from 
empire – as well as the social union and trade relations between England and Scotland 
which might be threatened by independence. The latter was raised in terms of the 
potential need to establish a border (build a wall in some accounts) between England 
and Scotland if independence happened. 
  
Inequality and marginalisation as the political frontier 
 
Overlapping with the official independence campaign was another, more radical form 
of populist politics, focused on the poorer areas of Scotland and less powerful 
communities. Independence was linked to diverse struggles to address inequalities of 
wealth and power linked primarily to social class, gender, ‘race’ and sexuality. The 
ideological content was disseminated in community-based campaign groups such as 
the Radical Independence Campaign, Women for Independence, Scots Asians for 
Yes, LGBTi for Independence, Commonweal and so on. These groups reflected 
different democratic demands which were unmet by the limitations on the Scottish 
parliament, or the politics of the UK parliament, and were able, in Laclau’s terms, to 
form a chain of equivalence linked to the cause of independence. What these various 
groups shared was the need to fundamentally change politics by ensuring different 
voices, experiences and interests would be part of what independence would mean. 
The frontier was between the powerful and powerless, not simply British nationalism 
or Scottish nationalism, which independence could address. 
  
These different constructions of ‘the people’ represent very different ways of doing 
politics, by bringing together new political subjects in some cases, but also based on a 
spectrum of ideological perspectives on the need for consensus or change to the status 
quo. What the article now focuses on is the potential of these constructions, 
particularly the frontier of marginalisation, because of its recognition of political 
inequality and unfulfilled democratic demands. 
  
Democratic innovation: ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ 
 
Democratic innovations ‘from above’ refer to the creation of spaces somewhere 
between deliberative democratic practices such as citizen juries, mini-publics and 
more direct democratic procedures such as participatory budgeting (Elstub and 
Escobar 2017). What is characteristic of these types of democratic innovation is that 
they are designed to address the perceived limitations of the failings of liberal 
democracy and, in this sense, are policy measures ‘from above’ which seek to 
legitimate and shape new forms of democratic life by renovating or reforming what 
exists already.  
 
Democratic innovation ‘from below’ seeks to radically transform the kinds of 
inequality which liberal democracy is based on and which it reinforces by creating 
new structures for excluded voices and experiences to be heard. From the perspective 
of liberal democracy, this might be framed as generating ‘too much’ participation. 
This kind of populist politics has the advantage of working in the idiom and culture of 
socially excluded groups in order to provide a voice and channel for addressing the 
anger and resentment which inequality produces and sustains. Democratic innovation, 
in this agonistic sense, includes new and inclusive structures of participation, along 
with the generation of a culture and idiom of active political engagement rooted in 
lived experience. It is what della Porta (2017) refers to as social movement politics. 
  
In the context of the referendum, this culture of political participation loosened the 
vice-like grip of formal politics on political debate.  It generated more inclusive and 
open spaces for participation in grassroots movements, aided by social media, which 
motivated widespread political debate in diverse spaces, in the home and in friendship 
networks. The inclusive nature of these democratic innovations ‘from below’ is that 
they provided a space which engaged people in politics in an unanticipated way.  
 
In addition to the above, adult education had a role to play in this process no matter 
how patchy and uneven it was in reality (see Crowther, 2015, 2018). From 
registration campaigns to small-scale classes on nationalism, to organised hustings 
and large public debates on the contentious issues involved, into dreaming activities 
to think about the kind of future people wanted for Scotland. As such, the referendum 
created opportunities for adult education to connect with the ferment of political 
excitement that had spread organically and enthusiastically ‘from below’. In the 
context of formal education there is a connection between being more educated and 
being less able to be manipulated. The same might be said about the impact of 
widespread participation in informal political education and thinking.    
  
In summary, the referendum led to a widening and deepening of politicisation in 
Scottish communities through formal political processes but, more significantly, 
through the emergence of a deliberative and participatory form of populist political 
engagement. The democratic innovations ‘from below’ enabled people to learn, 
discuss and argue the merits of a variety of issues and not merely those issues which 
dominated the agenda of the official campaigns. A pluralistic political culture, which 
had vibrancy and energy, emerged that filled independence with democratic demands 
for addressing social and political inequality. This popular participation in political 
thinking and argument had a number of consequences not least being the emergence 
of an independence of mind that is an essential ingredient of a democratic culture and 
polity. Adult educators, positioned to respond to innovations from ‘below’ have the 
opportunity to generate curriculum from local concerns so that dissent and affective 
energy is less likely to be misdirected towards right-wing populist nationalism, and 
more likely to be mapped onto cogent and critical analyses of public issues. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Popular dissent and anger at being ignored, denigrated or blamed (by political elites 
or agents of patriarchy) for circumstances beyond individual control is, as we have 
shown, an opportunity for critical education. Popular feelings of neglect can be seen 
as legitimate expressions of rage as well as powerful forms of motivation which can 
be channeled into progressive or regressive activities depending on the outlets 
available. Adult education in communities can provide the space for people to think 
critically about their choices, in order to marry reason and affect in new and 
productive ways. It can never offer this space if, from the outset, adult educators 
dismiss populist reactions as indicative of irrationality, ignorance or blind rage. 
  
Adult education can enrich democratic spaces 'from below' to test out the ideas and 
experiences which inform action. In such spaces the grip of the political elite, 
demagogic politics, or mediatised accounts of social problems, can be resources for 
decoding populism and the factors that shape and motivate it. It is unlikely to engage 
hardcore racists (and others) but such groups can only thrive in the discontent which 
they seek to align to their own right-wing populist agendas. As our vignettes 
demonstrate, the relationship between ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ is not straightforward. 
In creating spaces for listening, discussion (re)framing problems, new possibilities 
emerge for tacking the 'private troubles', which are often neglected as 'public issues' 
or, when they are recognised, simply end up 'blaming the victim'. 
  
Contrary to the view that populism is part of a democratic deficit we argue it may 
instead be used as a critical resource for developing a culture and process of 
democracy that transcends the limitations of liberal democracy. Adult education in 
these terms provides the agora for an agonistic democracy.  However, we have also 
surfaced a discussion about the dangers of conflating agonistic democracy with left 
populism on the grounds of ideological difference, organisational form and political 
strategy. The kind of education we have advocated is an important part of this 
conversation, since actually existing ‘left populism’, if we can call it that, is grounded 
in the rich informal learning occurring through participatory democracy, which is 
anathema to right-wing authoritarian populism. This point is politically significant 
because the general label ‘populism’ may simply be too alienating to those who have 
been excluded by racist and xenophobic discourse.  
 
As we have argued above, representations of populism and populist representations 
offer points of intervention, when and where possible, to further the spaces for 
democratic life and to nurture the values of equality and social justice which go with 
it. The future is uncertain, so that is cause for hope. 
 
 
[1] A notable exception is Latin America where populism, as a longstanding feature of politics, doesn’t 
carry the same pejorative baggage (Kane, 1999). 
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